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Abstract
We investigate how environmental and trade policies aﬀect the transfer of
environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By com-
paring free trade and tariﬀ policy without commitment, the following results are
obtained. First, the existence of an environmental policy in a local country in-
duces technology transfer from a foreign country. Second, there is a possibility
that free trade is preferable to a tariﬀ policy for both countries even though free
trade lowers the environmental tax rate. Third, the quantity of the local ﬁrm’s
product decreases for higher environmental damage. On the other hand, import
of environmentally eﬃcient goods from the foreign country increases.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D43; F13; L13; Q56
Keywords: Environmental technology transfer; Free trade; Tariﬀ protection
1 Introduction
The importance of technology transfer for a global environmental policy has been
well recognized.1 For instance, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change includes provisions calling for the transfer of environmental technologies and
∗Corresponding author. E-mail address: takeuchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp
1Popp (2008) considers public funding and private ﬁrm behavior as sources of technological transfer.
A representative example of public funding is aid from governments or non-governmental organizations
in the form of oﬃcial developmental assistance. Private transfer of technology can take place in three
ways: trade, foreign direct investment, and licensing to a local ﬁrm.
1know-how related to environmentally sound technologies. However, there seems to be
disagreement on how this transfer can be achieved. Developing countries often claim
that compulsory licensing, by which a government forces a patent holder to grant the
use of the technologies to the state or others, is eﬀective for transferring environmental
technologies. On the other hand, industrialized countries tend to prefer a free trade
policy, in which technology is indirectly transferred through the trade of commodities
produced in their countries. From this standpoint, it is necessary to remove tariﬀs and
other trade barriers to decrease the price of environmental technology.2
It is important to note that these transfers of technology, either through licens-
ing contract or through import of environmentally eﬃcient goods, are aﬀected by the
design of environmental and trade policies. If a developing country implements an en-
vironmental policy, it provides an incentive for the local ﬁrm to adopt environmental
technology. Stronger environmental regulation would lead to higher value being set on
the environmental technology, which in turn would bring higher revenue to the licensor.
In the context of studies on trade and environment, it is often pointed out that a
trade liberalization may induce weaker environmental regulation as a means of compen-
sating the domestic ﬁrm (see Rauscher, 1994; Ulph and Valentini, 2001). If the weaker
environmental regulation discourages the ﬁrm from adopting cleaner technology, the
value of the technology might decrease. Our main question is whether a developed
country still prefers diﬀusion of environmental technology through free trade, even if
trade liberalization leads to weaker environmental regulation in the developing country.
To answer this question, we consider an international duopoly model with global
pollution and investigate how environmental and trade policies aﬀect the transfer of
environmental technology. We extend the model of Iida and Takeuchi (2010) to include
the possibility of an environmental policy in the local country. 3 The main results
2A World Bank (2008) summary of applied tariﬀs for solar photovoltaic technology in 18 high-
GHG-emitting developing countries found that except in one case, import tariﬀs range from 32 to 6
percent. These are much higher than the average tariﬀs in high-income OECD countries (4%). Tariﬀ
barriers on ﬂuorescent lamps in these 18 countries are also high, varying from 30 to 5 percent, again
with one exception. The tariﬀ on ﬂuorescent lamps is the highest across all clean technologies assessed.
3Iida and Takeuchi (2010) do not consider environmental policy instruments on the assumption
that it is politically diﬃcult to implement an environmental tax. See other studies that consider the
trade policy as the second best policy tool, for example, Copeland (1996), Ludema and Takeno (2007)
and Regibeau and Gallegos (2004).
2can be summarized as follows. First, the existence of an environmental policy in a
local country induce technology transfer from a foreign county. Second, free trade is
preferable to a tariﬀ policy for both country when the environmental damage is high.
This has signiﬁcant policy implications when one considers the claim for environmen-
tal degradation caused by trade liberalization. Third, technological transfer through
licensing contract decrease for higher environmental damage by the decrease in quan-
tity of the local ﬁrm’s product. On the other hand, import of environmentally eﬃcient
goods from the foreign country increases.
The impact of strategic trade and environmental policies has been previously inves-
tigated by several authors. Walz and Wellisch (1997) compare free trade and export
subsidies with a third-market model in the context of local pollution. They show
that free trade (which means a ban on export subsidies) enhances the social welfare
of symmetric exporting countries. Although reducing the export subsidy lowers the
environmental tax to compensate the ﬁrm, the compensation is less than the export
subsidy reduction. Therefore, free trade raises the price of the ﬁnal product and ex-
tracts rent from consumers of the third market. The exporting countries beneﬁt from
this. However, because the higher price of the product lowers the consumer surplus of
the third market, free trade is not preferable from the perspective of world welfare.
Tanguay (2001) extends the analysis to trans-boundary pollution under the reciprocal-
markets model. He shows that tariﬀ is preferable to free trade. In the case of free trade,
the government sets the environmental tax rate lower than that under a tariﬀ policy to
protect its own ﬁrm. Moreover, because of transboundary pollution, the government
does not have an incentive to set a higher environmental tax in order to shift the pol-
lution activity to another country. Therefore, free trade leads to a lower environmental
tax rate and worsens the social welfare.
Although many other studies have investigated the interaction between trade and
environmental policies (see, e.g., Burguet and Sempere, 2003; Lai and Hu, 2008; Ohori,
2006; Ray Chaudhuri and Baksi, 2009; Riveiro, 2008), to our knowledge there is no
study that analyzes the interaction regarding the impact on environmental technology
transfer. The most important contribution of our study is that we consider the role
of licensing contracts. The earlier studies argue that the strength of an environmental
3policy resulting from a trade policy signiﬁcantly impacts on environmental damage.
Therefore, if free trade leads to a lower environmental tax, it lowers social welfare
through deterioration of the environment. In contrast, we show that the strength of
an environmental policy resulting from a trade policy signiﬁcantly aﬀects the level of
license fees. If licensing occurs and eliminates environmental damage, the environmental
impact of free trade can be mitigated. We show that there is a possibility that free
trade is better than a tariﬀ policy for both countries even though free trade lowers the
environmental tax rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an
international duopoly model with global pollution. In Section 3, we investigate a free
trade policy. In Section 4, we investigate a tariﬀ policy without a commitment to the
tariﬀ level. In Section 5, we compare free trade with no commitment from the viewpoint
of equilibrium quantity and revenue, and social welfare. The case of tariﬀ policy with
pre-commitment is also examined. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly model with one foreign and one local ﬁrm. We suppose the goods
are homogeneous except for their environmental properties. The goods produced by the
local ﬁrm generate global external diseconomy. The foreign ﬁrm has clean technology
and its product does not adversely aﬀect the environment. The clean technology of the
foreign ﬁrm is transferable. If the technology is transferred by a licensing agreement to
the local ﬁrm, its product does not cause environmental damage. We assume that the
license fee is paid by royalties.
The proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm and the local ﬁrm are π
j,k







l = (pj,k − τj − rj)ql, respectively, where j = {F,T} represents the trade policy
with F denoting free trade and T denoting the tariﬀ policy, and k = {L,N} represents
the state of licensing contract with L denoting licensing and N denoting no licensing.
The parameter t denotes the tariﬀ rate imposed on the product of the foreign ﬁrm,
τj is the environmental tax rate imposed on one unit of pollution, and r > 0 is the
royalty rate. Note that when there is no licensing, r = 0. Further, in the case of
free trade, t = 0. Following Qiu and Yu (2009), we assume a linear inverse demand




l , and standardize the marginal private cost of production
to zero. The social welfare of the foreign country is the sum of the producer surplus




f − (γ/2)EDj,k.4 The social welfare of
the local country is the sum of the consumer surplus, the proﬁt of the local ﬁrm, the













f −(γ/2)EDj,k. We assume that one unit of production
generates one unit of pollution. The environmental damage is represented as EDj,k =
(q
j,k
l )2 and is common for both countries.5 The evaluation of the environmental damage
is denoted by γ/2.6 Since the licensing contract eliminates the environmental damage,
EDj,L = 0.
3 Free Trade
First, we consider the free trade case. The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst
stage, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers royalty r to the local ﬁrm. In the second stage, the local
ﬁrm decides to accept the oﬀer. In the third stage, if licensing does not occur in the
previous stage, the local government determines environmental tax rate τ. In the ﬁnal
stage, the ﬁrms engage in quantity competition. The equilibrium concept is SPE. The
game is solved backwards.
To clarify the eﬀect of the tariﬀ policy on technology transfer, we consider only
the case in which the local government determines the optimal environmental tax after
the licensing contract. Recent studies have pointed out that the regulator may change
the pre-committed environmental standard because of a lack of credibility (see, e.g.,
Conrad 2001; Puller 2006).
In the ﬁnal stage, each ﬁrm determines its output. The equilibrium quantity and
4We omit the consumption in the foreign country for convenience. Because the markets are seg-
mented between local and foreign, the result holds even if we include the foreign market.
5Since we consider global pollution including climate change resulting from the emission of carbon
dioxide, environmental damage is assumed to be the same for both the foreign country and the local
country.
6The γ should be diﬀerent between the foreign and local countries depending on the situations and
characteristics of the environmental issues. For example, assuming a higher γ for the foreign country
and including the foreign environmental policy would allow us to address the issue of a competitive
environmental policy between countries. However, under the present framework of analysis, we obtain
qualitatively the same results even with the diﬀerent γ. We assume γf = γl = γ/2 to simplify the
analysis.
5proﬁt with and without licensing are q
F,L
f = (α + r)/3, q
F,L
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F,N
















, where superscripts F, L and N represent free trade,
licensing, and no licensing, respectively.
In the third stage, if the local ﬁrm has not accepted a licensing contract, the local
government imposes an environmental tax on the local ﬁrm. The social welfare of the


























If γ > 1.5, then τF > 0. Since ∂τF/∂γ > 0, the local government increases the optimal
environmental tax for higher environmental damage. The equilibrium quantity and
proﬁt without licensing are q
F,N
f = 2αγ/(3 + 4γ), q
F,N

















In the licensing stage, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers the license fee rF, which maximizes




l . The optimal license fee is a corner solution and is




l . Then, if π
F,L
f (rF) ≥ π
F,N
f , the foreign ﬁrm
licenses its environmental technology to the local ﬁrm. Because q
F,L
f (rF) = q
F,N
f , the






l . Therefore, the foreign ﬁrm
licenses its technology to the local ﬁrm if rF > 0, and in turn τF > 0. We obtain the
next proposition.
Proposition 1. When γ > 1.5, licensing occurs. Otherwise, licensing does not occur.
We depict the equilibrium environmental tax and license fee in Figure 1. The left
and the right panels of the ﬁgure are the equilibrium environmental tax and license
fee, respectively. The vertical axis of the left panel is the environmental tax rate and
that of the right panel is the license fee, and the horizontal axes are the evaluation
of the environmental damage. When γ ≤ 1.5, the environmental tax rate is negative
and the local ﬁrm receives the subsidy (τF < 0). When γ > 1.5, the local ﬁrm incurs
the license fee to avoid the tax payment. The dotted line in the left panel implies








Figure 1: The equilibrium environmental tax and license fee in free trade
ﬁnding of Iida and Takeuchi (2010), licensing occurs even under free trade. This can be
attributed to the existence of an environmental policy in the local country that gives
a local ﬁrm an incentive to adopt the environmental technology. Indeed, if τF > 0,
licensing occurs. This obviously means that the incentive for the local ﬁrm to accept
the contract is avoidance of regulation. When γ ≤ 1.5, licensing does not occur and
the local government subsidizes the polluting local ﬁrm.
Corollary 1. When γ ≤ 1.5, the local government subsidizes the polluting local ﬁrm,
therefore, τF ≤ 0.
Under the free trade regime, the local government does not have the means to
protect the local ﬁrm directly. The government, therefore, uses an environmental tax
as an instrument to protect the local ﬁrm.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium value of quantity (the left panel) and proﬁt (the
right panel). The quantity and proﬁt of the local ﬁrm decrease, and those of the foreign
ﬁrm increase in γ. On the other hand, import of environmentally eﬃcient goods from
the foreign country increases in γ.
When γ ≤ 1.5, because the local ﬁrm receives a subsidy (τF < 0), the quantity
of the local ﬁrm is larger than that of the foreign ﬁrm. When γ > 1.5, the local ﬁrm
adopts the environmental technology and pay the license fee. Since a larger γ implies











































Figure 3: The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare in free trade
1). This drawback to the local ﬁrm results in an equilibrium quantity being less than
that of the foreign ﬁrm.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium consumer surplus (the left panel) and the social
welfare (the right panel). Although the quantity of the foreign ﬁrm increases in γ, the
reduction of the quantity of the local ﬁrm dominates. Therefore, consumer surplus
decreases in γ.
When γ < 1.5, because the licensing contract does not occur, the social welfare of
the local country decreases in γ. While the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm increases, the
environmental damage also increases in γ. The social welfare of the foreign country
8depends on these two eﬀects. When γ is small, the eﬀect of environmental damage
dominates that of the proﬁt. As a result, the social welfare of the foreign country
initially decreases and then begins to increase in γ. At γ = 1.5, the social welfare
of both countries increases discontinuously. This is because licensing eliminates the
environmental damage. After the licensing contract, there is no tariﬀ revenue and the
social welfare of the local country decreases. The social welfare of the foreign country
becomes equal to the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm and increases in γ.
4 Tariﬀ policy
Next, we consider the case of tariﬀ policy. While the optimal tariﬀ will depend on
whether the tariﬀs can be pre-committed before the licensing decisions, it is natural
to assume that a government has the incentive to change a pre-announced tariﬀ rate
(Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006; Neary and Leahy, 2000). Thus, we analyze a no-
commitment regime as a probable tariﬀ policy.
In this case, the timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the foreign ﬁrm
oﬀers a licensing contract with royalty rT to the local ﬁrm. In the second stage, the local
ﬁrm decides to accept the oﬀer. In the third stage, if licensing does not occur in the
previous stage, the local government determines the tariﬀ rate tT,N and environmental
tax rate τT. If licensing does occur, the local government only determines the tariﬀ
rate tT,L. In the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms engage in quantity competition. The equilibrium
concept is SPE. The game is solved backwards.
In the ﬁnal stage, each ﬁrm determines its output. The equilibrium quantity and
proﬁt with and without licensing are q
T,L
f = (α+r −2tT,L)/3, q
T,L








































, respectively. The social welfare


























the third stage, when licensing does not occur, the local government determines the
9environmental tax rate and the tariﬀ rate to maximize SW
T,N
l . The FOCs yield
ˆ τ
T,N =










l /∂τ∂t > 0, there is a complementary relationship between τT,N and tT,N.
When the tariﬀ rate is high, the environmentally friendly goods produced by the foreign
ﬁrm cannot be diﬀused. Thus, the local government sets a high environmental tax while
protecting the competitiveness of the local ﬁrm by setting a high tariﬀ. On the other
hand, when the tariﬀ rate is lower, the local government sets a lower environmental
tax. The lower environmental tax protects the local ﬁrm from competition with the















When γ < 1, the environmental tax rate takes a negative value and the local government
actually subsidizes the local ﬁrm, despite the pollution caused by it.
The optimal tariﬀ rate takes its eﬀect on the environment into account. This is
conﬁrmed by tT,N = α/3 − 2α/3(2 + 3γ) = α/3 − (∂(γ/2)EDT,N/∂ql − τT,N)∂ql/∂t.
The last term of the above equation corresponds to the environmental damage caused
by the marginal increase in the tariﬀ rate.
When licensing occurs, the optimal tariﬀ rate is tT,L = α/3. We obtain the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal tariﬀ is higher with licensing than without licensing:
tT,L > tT,N.
When licensing does not occur, the local government must consider protecting both
the environment and the local ﬁrm. On the other hand, the local country can con-
centrate on protecting the local ﬁrm when licensing occurs and environmental damage
is internalized. The diﬀerence leads to a higher optimal tariﬀ under the no licensing
10regime. The relationship between the diﬀerence in tariﬀs, tT,L−tT,N, and the evaluation
of environmental damage is as follows.
Corollary 2. The diﬀerence between the tariﬀ rate with and without licensing is
smaller when γ is higher: ∂[tT,L − tT,N]/∂γ < 0
The local government enhances its regulation when environmental damage is large.
Therefore, from (2), (3), the tariﬀ rate tT,N is also enhanced to protect the local ﬁrm,
which reduces the diﬀerence tT,L − tT,N. In contrast, when the implementation of
environmental tax is restricted as in Iida and Takeuchi (2010), it sets a lower tariﬀ rate
for higher γ to diﬀuse the environmentally friendly goods produced by the foreign ﬁrm.
The third stage equilibrium quantity and proﬁt with and without licensing are q
T,L
f =
(3r + α)/9, q
T,L
l = 2(2α − 3r)/9, π
T,L











f = αγ/(2 + 3γ), q
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l . When γ ≤ 4.333, the optimal license fee is a corner solution
and is derived as rT





When γ > 4.333, the interior solution is derived as rT
I = 7α/15. When γ is small,
because environmental damage is small, the value of the environmental technology (the
license fee) is also small; therefore, when γ ≤ 4.333, the optimal license fee is derived
as a corner solution. However, when γ is large, because the value of the environmental
technology is higher, rT
C is larger than rT
I , which is independent of γ. Since the foreign
ﬁrm incurs a tariﬀ payment that increases the marginal cost of its product, it is no
longer beneﬁcial to require as large a license fee as possible when γ > 4.333.




C) = α2 (−29 + 30γ + 9γ2)/9(2+3γ)2 (when γ ≤ 4.333) and π
T,L
f (rT
I ) = 2α2/15





f and the foreign ﬁrm licenses the
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when γ > 4.333. Hence, we obtain the next proposition.









Figure 4: The equilibrium environmental tax and license fee in tariﬀ policy
We depict the equilibrium environmental tax and license fee in Figure 4. The left
and the right panels of the ﬁgure are the equilibrium environmental tax and license fee,
respectively. The vertical axis of the left panel is the environmental tax rate and that
of right is the license fee, and the horizontal axis is the evaluation of environmental
damage. The dotted line is the environmental tax rate if the licensing does not occur.
The local ﬁrm receives the subsidy (τT < 0) when γ < 0.967. The local ﬁrm pays the
license fee when γ ≥ 0.967. The environmental tax rate and license fee are the marginal
cost of production for the local ﬁrm, and increase in γ.
As we have already examined, the optimal tariﬀ rate is tT,L = α/3 under a licensing
contract (Figure 5).
The left and the right panels of Figure 6 show the equilibrium quantity and proﬁt,
respectively. The quantity of the local ﬁrm decreases in γ. This is because the marginal
cost of production increases in γ, as illustrated in Figure 4. Since the license fee is




l , the quantity decreases continuously in spite of a
discontinuous increase in the marginal cost of production at γ = 0.967.
Although the tariﬀ rate increases in γ when γ < 0.967, the quantity of the foreign
ﬁrm increases. This is because the local government increases the environmental tax
rate more than the tariﬀ rate. Consequently, there is a larger downward shift in the
reaction function of the local ﬁrm than that of the foreign ﬁrm. It decreases the quantity






Figure 5: The equilibrium tariﬀ rate in tariﬀ policy
occurs, there is a discontinuous increase in the tariﬀ rate and the quantity of the foreign
ﬁrm drops down. However, because of the license revenue, the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm
keeps increasing in γ. When γ > 4.333, the license fee and therefore each ﬁrm’s quantity
do not depend on γ.
We depict the equilibrium consumer surplus (the left panel) and social welfare (the
right panel) in Figure 7. As is in the case of free trade, consumer surplus decreases
in γ because the reduction of the quantity of the local ﬁrm dominates the increase
in the foreign ﬁrm’s output. At γ = 0.967, consumer surplus drops oﬀ because of a
discontinuous decrease in the quantity of the foreign ﬁrm. When γ > 4.333, consumer
surplus does not depend on γ.
The social welfare of the local country decreases in γ. The social welfare of the
foreign country initially decreases, and then begins to increase in γ. This interpretation
is similar to that of free trade. After the licensing contract, the social welfare of the
local country decreases and the social welfare of the foreign ﬁrm (which equals the proﬁt
of the foreign ﬁrm) increases. However, unlike what happens in the case of free trade,
the social welfare of the local country is always larger than that of the foreign country.



























































Figure 7: The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare in tariﬀ policy
145 Discussions
5.1 Comparison
First, we compare free trade with tariﬀ policy on the range where the licensing contract
occurs. Licensing occurs when γ > 1.5 under free trade and γ ≥ 0.967 under tariﬀ
policy. The range under tariﬀ policy is larger than that under free trade.
Previous literature on the strategic environmental policies have pointed out that
free trade lowers environmental regulation to compensate the domestic ﬁrm (Tanguay,
2001; Walz and Wellisch, 1997). Therefore, in such a case, the incentive of the local ﬁrm
to adopt environmental technology may be weakened, and it may cause social welfare
loss. However, we can show that there is a case where free trade is Pareto improving
to tariﬀ policy, although it leads to weaker environmental regulation.
Proposition 4. World welfare under tariﬀ policy is higher than (resp. lower than or
even with) that under free trade, when γ ∈ (0,0.203) and when γ ∈ [0.967,1.5] (resp.
otherwise ).
Figure 8 illustrates the situation by comparing the social welfare of each country.
The upper part represents the policy preferred by the foreign country and the lower
represents that by the local country. Initial T means tariﬀ policy and F means free
trade.
When γ ∈ (0,0.967), licensing does not occur under either regime. As a result,
the foreign ﬁrm does not pay a tariﬀ and the foreign country prefers free trade to tariﬀ
policy. On the other hand, the local country prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade because of
the tariﬀ revenue. When γ ∈ [0.967,1.5], licensing occurs only under tariﬀ policy. The
foreign country prefers tariﬀ policy in this case, because there is revenue from a license
fee and no environmental damage. The local country also prefers tariﬀ policy because
of the tariﬀ revenue. When γ ∈ (1.5,4.333], licensing occurs under both regimes. The
foreign country prefers free trade to tariﬀ policy because there is no tariﬀ payment.
The local country also prefers free trade to tariﬀ policy as long as γ ∈ (1.5,4.301].
This is because of the lower license fee under the free trade. Since free trade promote












Figure 8: Comparison between each country’s social welfare under free trade and tariﬀ
policy
lower environmental tax. It means that the local ﬁrm has less incentive to adopt an
innovative environmental technology under such a regime.
When γ > 4.301, the local country prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade. Since higher
γ implies higher license fee, as illustrated in the previous section, the quantity of the
local ﬁrm decreases and that of the foreign ﬁrm increases in γ (see the left panel of
Figure 6). Consequently, the local country earns larger tariﬀ revenue when γ is higher
under tariﬀ policy. When γ > 4.301, this beneﬁt exceeds the cost of the higher license
fee and the local country prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade. Moreover, when γ > 4.333,
the license fee is determined by interior solution and independent of γ. While the local
country’s social welfare decreases in γ under free trade (see the right panel of Figure
3), it is not aﬀected under tariﬀ policy (see the right panel of Figure 7). Thus, the local
country prefers tariﬀ policy to free trade when γ > 4.333. The foreign country prefers
free trade because there is no tariﬀ payment. To sum up, a comparison of the social
welfare of each country under each regime leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5. When γ ∈ [0.967,1.5] both countries prefer tariﬀ policy to free trade.
When γ ∈ (1.5,4.301] both countries prefer free trade to tariﬀ policy.
Our main result can be summarized as follows. When the evaluation of the environ-
mental damage (γ) is small, the tariﬀ policy is useful to encourage the environmental
technology transfer. However, when the evaluation of the environmental damage is large
enough that the local country adopts environmental regulation, free trade is beneﬁcial
for the world welfare.
165.2 Commitment to a tariﬀ
So far, the tariﬀ rate is assumed to be determined after the licensing contract. If the
regulator could commit itself in advance to a speciﬁc tariﬀ rate, how does the previous
result change? In this subsection, we consider the case of commitment to a tariﬀ. We
show that our main result does not change, except that there is a situation where the
local country subsidizes the foreign ﬁrm to lower the license fee. Here we show only the
result. The proof is in the Appendix.
We obtain the ﬁrst stage equilibrium where the local government determines the
optimal tariﬀ rate as follows.
Proposition 6. When γ ∈ (0,0.5], the optimal tariﬀ rate is tC,N and licensing does not
occur. When γ ∈ (0.5,1.823], the optimal tariﬀ rate is ¯ t
C,L
C and licensing occurs. When
γ ∈ (1.823,5.266], the optimal tariﬀ rate is t
C,L
C and licensing occurs. When γ > 5.266,
the optimal tariﬀ rate is t
C,L
I and licensing occurs.
Figure 9 illustrates Proposition 6. The vertical axis is the tariﬀ rate and the hori-
zontal axis is the evaluation parameter of environmental damage. We also depict the
equilibrium environmental tax and license fee in Figure 10. The left and the right panels
of the ﬁgure are the equilibrium environmental tax and the license fee, respectively. The
dotted line is the environmental tax rate when licensing contracts are not entered into.
In the case of commitment, the local government can induce licensing contracts through
the tariﬀ rate. Because the license fee is equal to the environmental tax rate (rC = τC)
and ∂τC/t > 0, the local government lowers the tariﬀ rate to suppress the license fee.
Moreover, because ∂τC/γ > 0, to suppress the license fee to low levels (almost zero; see
the left panel of Figure 10), the local government puts a lower tariﬀ rate for higher γ
when γ ∈ (0.5,1.823) (Figure 9). When γ > 1.5, the tariﬀ rate becomes negative and
works as an import subsidy for the foreign ﬁrm. We obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 3. When γ ∈ (1.5,2.303), the optimal tariﬀ rate is negative.
When γ > 1.823, it is not beneﬁcial for the local country to apply a negative tariﬀ
(tC < 0) anymore. Although the license fee also increase, the local government increases
the tariﬀ rate to increases tariﬀ revenue. We compare the world welfare under free trade














Figure 9: The optimal tariﬀ under commitment to a tariﬀ
Proposition 7. World welfare under commitment is higher than (resp. lower than or
even with) that under free trade, when γ ∈ (0,0.203) and when γ ∈ (0.5,2.303) (resp.
otherwise).
Therefore, free trade is preferable to a tariﬀ policy with commitment when the
evaluation of the environmental damage is high (when γ ≥ 2.303).
Figure 12 compares the social welfare of each country. Interpretation of the ﬁgure
is mostly the same as that of the no commitment case, except for γ > 1.5, where
licensing occurs under both cases. If the local government can commit itself to a tariﬀ,
it sets a tariﬀ rate that attracts the lowest possible license fee. Therefore, the local
country always prefers commitment to free trade. When γ ∈ (1.5,2.303), the foreign
ﬁrm receives a subsidy in the form of negative tariﬀ. So the foreign country also prefers
commitment to free trade. When γ ≥ 2.303, the foreign ﬁrm incurs a positive tariﬀ
again and prefers free trade to tariﬀ policy with commitment. Hence, a comparison of
the social welfare of each country leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8. When γ ∈ (0.5,2.303) both countries prefer commitment to free trade.
Unlike the case of free trade or tariﬀ policy, there is a range where consumer surplus
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Figure 10: The equilibrium environmental tax and license fee under commitment to a tariﬀ
CSC
γ
































Figure 12: Comparison between each country’s social welfare under free trade and
commitment to a tariﬀ
γ ∈ (0.5,1.823]. Consequently, the increase in the foreign ﬁrm’s output dominates
the decrease in the local ﬁrm’s output. The proﬁt of the local ﬁrm decreases and the
subsidy to the foreign ﬁrm (tC < 0) increases in γ. Since these costs are less than the
increase in consumer surplus, the social welfare of the local country initially increases
in this range of γ.
The range over which licensing occurs under tariﬀ policy with commitment is larger
than that under free trade or under tariﬀ policy without commitment. Through its
commitment, the local government can encourage licensing contracts by its tariﬀ pol-
icy. The local government sets the environmental tax rate higher than it would under
no commitment, thereby inducing licensing contracts. Therefore, licensing contracts
are promoted by committing to a tariﬀ rate. In the case of no commitment, the deci-
sion of the licensing contract is already made when the local government sets the tariﬀ
rate. Therefore, if licensing does not occur, the local government sets a lower environ-
mental tax to protect the local ﬁrm, which discourages the agreement of environmental
technology transfer.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the welfare implications of a free trade regime and a licensing
agreement within a framework of international duopoly involving global pollution. We
have shown that although free trade lowers environmental regulation relative to a tariﬀ
policy, free trade is preferable to a tariﬀ policy for world welfare when the evaluation of
the environmental damage is higher. Moreover, we have shown that there is a possibility
20that free trade dominates a tariﬀ policy in the Paretian sense when the environmental
damage is within a certain range. The cost of free trade for the local country is that
there is no tariﬀ revenue. The beneﬁt is the lower license fee that is the result of lower
environmental regulation. When the environmental damage is within a certain range,
the beneﬁt dominates the cost, and the local country prefers free trade to a tariﬀ policy.
When the developing country cares less about the environmental damage, a tariﬀ
policy is beneﬁcial to transferring environmental technology and enhancing the world
welfare. If the concern of the developing country is high enough to conduct environ-
mental regulation, free trade is preferable to a tariﬀ policy for world welfare.
21Appendix
The equilibrium value under free trade
We obtain the following result for the case of free trade when 0 < γ ≤ 1.5 where






































3α2(3 + 2γ + 4γ2)
2(3 + 4γ)2 . (9)



















α2 (−9 + 6γ + 4γ2)








α2 (−9 + 6γ + 4γ2)
(3 + 4γ)2 , SW
F
l =
α2(27 + 12γ + 4γ2)




3α2(3 + 8γ + 4γ2)
2(3 + 4γ)2 . (13)
The equilibrium value under tariﬀ policy without commitment
We obtain the following result for the case of tariﬀ policy when 0 < γ < 0.967] where






































α2 (4 + 4γ + 5γ2)
2(2 + 3γ)2 . (17)
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α2 (−29 + 30γ + 9γ2)
9(2 + 3γ)2 , SW
T
l =
α2 (31 + 12γ + 9γ2)




α2 (35 + 96γ + 45γ2)
18(2 + 3γ)2 . (21)












































The equilibrium value under tariﬀ policy with commitment
We obtain the following result for the case of commitment to a tariﬀ when γ ∈ (0,0.5]






































α2 (4 + 4γ + 5γ2)
2(2 + 3γ)2 . (29)






























(3 + 2γ)2 , SW
C
l =
α2 (3 + 20γ − 4γ2)




α2 (5 + 12γ + 4γ2)
2(3 + 2γ)2 . (33)










































α2 (−4 + 8γ + 5γ2)
18γ2 . (37)















































The proof of Proposition 4
We compare world welfare in the case of free trade with that in the case of tariﬀ policy.
We compare SW F
w with SW T
w when γ ∈ (0,0.967) where licensing does not occur in






α2γ2 (−2 + 7γ + 14γ2)
(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 . (42)
Solving (−2 + 7γ + 14γ2) = 0 with respect to γ, we obtain γ ≈ 0.203. Therefore,
SW F
w < SW T
w if γ ∈ (0,0.203) and SW F
w ≥ SW T
w if γ ∈ [0.203,0.967).
We compare SW F
w with SW T
w when γ ∈ [0.967,1.5] where licensing occurs only in






α2 (9 − 516γ − 1460γ2 − 834γ3 + 252γ4)
18(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 > 0, (43)
if γ ∈ [0.966,1.5].
We compare SW F
w with SW T
w when γ ∈ (1.5,4.33] where licensing occurs in both






α2 (3 + 10γ + 6γ2)(3 + 34γ + 42γ2)
18(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 > 0. (44)
We compare SW F
w with SW T
w when γ > 4.333 where licensing occurs in both cases






α2(9 + 2γ)(9 + 22γ)
50(3 + 4γ)2 > 0. (45)
Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 5
First, we compare the foreign country’s social welfare in the case of free trade with
that in the case of tariﬀ policy. We compare SW F
f with SW T







α2γ2 (2 + 31γ + 40γ2)
2(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 > 0. (46)
We compare SW F
f with SW T






α2 (522 + 528γ − 1358γ2 − 1257γ3 + 360γ4)
18(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 < 0, (47)
if γ ∈ [0.967,1.5].
25We compare SW F
f with SW T






α2 (−63 − 330γ − 274γ2 + 222γ3 + 180γ4)
9(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 > 0, (48)
if γ ∈ (1.5,4.333].
We compare SW F
f with SW T






α2 (−153 + 42γ + 28γ2)
15(3 + 4γ)2 > 0, (49)
if γ > 4.333.
Next, we compare the local country’s social welfare in the case of free trade with
that in the case of tariﬀ policy. We compare SW F
l with SW T








2(2 + 3γ)(3 + 4γ)
< 0. (50)
We compare SW F
l with SW T






α2 (57 + 40γ − 42γ2 + 9γ3)
6(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)
< 0, (51)
if γ ∈ [0.967,1.5].
We compare SW F
l with SW T






α2 (−45 − 264γ − 344γ2 − 60γ3 + 36γ4)
6(2 + 3γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 . (52)
Solving (−45−264γ−344γ2−60γ3+36γ4) = 0 with respect to γ, we obtain γ ≈ 4.301.
Therefore, SW F
w ≥ SW T
w if γ ∈ (1.5,4.301) and SW F
w < SW T
w if γ ∈ (4.301,4.333].
We compare SW F
l with SW T






α2 (−1773 − 228γ + 148γ2)
150(3 + 4γ)2 < 0, (53)
if γ > 4.333.
Q.E.D.
26Commitment to a tariﬀ
In the case of commitment to a tariﬀ, the timing of the game is as follows; in the ﬁrst
stage, the local government determines the tariﬀ rate tC; in the second stage, the foreign
ﬁrm oﬀers a licensing contract with royalty rC to the local ﬁrm; in the third stage, the
local ﬁrm decides whether to accept the oﬀer; in the fourth stage, if licensing does not
occur in the previous stage, the local government determines the environmental tax rate
τC; and in the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms engage in quantity competition. The equilibrium
concept is SPE. The game is solved backwards.
In the ﬁnal stage, each ﬁrm determines its output. The equilibrium quantity and
proﬁt with and without the licensing contract are q
C,L
f = (α + r − 2t)/3, q
C,L
l = (α −
2r + t)/3, π
C,L


























2 − 4αr + 3r






α2(6 − γ) − t2(9 + γ) + 2t(3 + 2γ)τ − (3 + 4γ)τ2 + α(6t − 2tγ − 6τ + 4γτ)
18
.(55)
In the fourth stage, when licensing does not occur, the local government determines the
environmental tax rate to maximize (55). The equilibrium environmental tax rate is
τ
C =
t(3 + 2γ) − α(3 − 2γ)
3 + 4γ
. (56)
When t > α(3 − 2γ)/(3 + 2γ) ≡ t1, τC > 0. The fourth stage equilibrium quantity
and proﬁt where licensing does not occur are q
C,N
f = (2αγ − t − 2tγ)/(3 + 4γ), q
C,N
l =

















In the licensing stage, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers a license fee rC that maximizes its




l . The optimal license fee is a corner solution when t ≤
15α/(11 + 8γ) ≡ t2 and is derived as rC




l . Hence, if












f , the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm when it licenses the technology







l . Therefore, the foreign ﬁrm licenses its technology
to the local ﬁrm when rC
C > 0, and in turn t > t1. The optimal license fee is an interior
solution when t > t2 and is rC
I = (5α − t)/10. When t is higher, because ∂τC/∂t > 0,
the license fee rC
C rises. Moreover, the higher tariﬀ increases the production cost of
the foreign ﬁrm. Therefore when t > t2, the interior solution rC
I emerges. Then
the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm is π
C,L
f (rC












f when t > t1, π
C,L
f (rC
I ) > π
C,N
f when t > t2.
To sum up, the foreign ﬁrm licenses its technology when t > t1
The second stage equilibrium social welfare of the local country when licensing
occurs under the license fees rC
C and rC





α2 (27 + 12γ + 4γ2) + 8αt(−3 − γ + γ2) − 12t2γ(1 + γ)
2(3 + 4γ)2 (57)




(25α2 + 70αt − 99t2)
200
(58)




2αtγ + α2(3 + γ) − t2(2 + 3γ)
6 + 8γ
(59)
when t ≤ t1.
The optimal tariﬀ rate
In the ﬁrst stage, the local government determines the optimal tariﬀ rate. We must
consider the tariﬀ rate that is compatible with the licensing decision of stage 2. This
means there are three cases. Case 1 is that the local government determines tariﬀ rate
tC,L such that t1 < tC,L ≤ t2, and then licensing occurs under the license fee rC
C. Note
that we assumed t ≤ α/2 and because t1 ≥ α/2 when γ ≤ 0.5, there is no t such that
t > t1. So when γ ≤ 0.5, licensing does not occur. Case 2 is that the local government
determines tariﬀ rate tC,L such that tC,L > t2, and then licensing occurs under the
license fee rC
I . Case 3 is that the local government determines tariﬀ rate tC,N such that
tC,N ≤ t1, and then licensing does not occur.
28Case 1: licensing occurs under the license fee rC
C in the next stage
First, we consider Case 1, in which the local government determines the tariﬀ rate that
will maximize social welfare in the local country, in anticipation of a next stage in which




α(−3 − γ + γ2)
3γ(1 + γ)
. (60)
If γ ∈ (1.823,6.808] then t1 < t
C,L
C ≤ t2. Therefore, if γ ∈ (1.823,6.808], t
C,L
C is the
equilibrium tariﬀ rate that is compatible with the licensing stage decision. Otherwise,
t
C,L
C is incompatible with the licensing decision. However, if the local government de-
termines a tariﬀ rate such that ¯ t
C,L
C = t1+ε where ε > 0 is small enough, then licensing
occurs under the tariﬀ rate ¯ t
C,L
C . Moreover, if the local government determines the tariﬀ
rate such that ¯ t
C,L
C2 = t2, then licensing occurs under the tariﬀ rate ¯ t
C,L
C2 .
Case 2: licensing occurs under the license fee rC
I in the next stage
Next, we consider Case 2, in which the local government determines the tariﬀ rate that
will maximize social welfare in the local country, in anticipation of a next stage in which







If γ > 3.929 then t
C,L
I > t2. Therefore, if γ > 3.929, t
C,L
I is the equilibrium tariﬀ rate
that is compatible with the licensing stage decision. Otherwise, t
C,L
I is incompatible
with the licensing decision. However, if the local government determines a tariﬀ rate
such that ¯ t
C,L
I = t2 + ε where ε > 0 is small enough, then licensing occurs under the
tariﬀ rate ¯ t
C,L
I .
Case 3: licensing does not occur in the next stage
Finally, we consider Case 3, in which the local government determines a tariﬀ rate in
anticipation of a next stage in which licensing will not occur. The optimal tariﬀ rate






29If γ ≤ 1 then tC,N ≤ t1. Therefore, if γ ≤ 1, tC,N is the equilibrium tariﬀ rate that is
compatible with the licensing stage decision. Othewise, tC,N is incompatible with the
next stage decision. However, when γ > 1, if the local government determines a tariﬀ
rate such that ¯ tC,N = t1, then licensing does not occur under the tariﬀ rate ¯ tC,N.
The local government will choose a tariﬀ rate that will induce the largest social
welfare. If the local government wants to obtain this result when licensing occurs, it
will set the optimal tariﬀ rate at t
C,L
C or ¯ t
C,L




I or ¯ t
C,L
I . If it does not, it will
set the optimal tariﬀ rate at tC,N or ¯ tC,N. From the above, we obtain Proposition 6.
The equilibrium environmental tax when licensing does not occur is τC(tC,N) =
2α(−1+γ)/(2+3γ). The equilibrium license fee when tC = t
C,L






C ) = α(−3 − 2γ + 2γ2)/3γ(1 + γ), and rC
I (t
C,L
I ) = 46α/99, respectively.
The decision of the optimal tariﬀ rate
The social welfare of the local country, under a tariﬀ rate when t = tC,L, when t = ¯ t
C,L
C ,
and when t = t
C,L














α2(3 + 4γ)2 (3 + 20γ − 4γ2) + B






α2 (−77 + 128γ + 16γ2)
2(11 + 8γ)2 , (65)
where B = 8α(−27 − 72γ − 42γ2 + 20γ3 + 16γ4)ε − 12γ(1 + γ)(3 + 2γ)2ε2.
The social welfare of the local country, under a tariﬀ rate when t = t
C,L
I and that
when t = ¯ t
C,L














100α2(−77 + 128γ + 16γ2) + D
200(11 + 8γ2)
, (67)
where D = 40α(−605 − 286γ + 112γ2)ε − 99(11 + 8γ)2ε2.
The social welfare of the local country, under a tariﬀ rate when t = tC,N and, that












α2 (3 + 16γ − 4γ2)
2(3 + 2γ)2 (69)
We compare the social welfare of the local ﬁrm where licensing occurs with that
where licensing does not occur for γ > 0.5. There are ﬁve cases that we must con-












































































































when γ > 6.808. Note that we con-
sider ε small enough, therefore, the case in which ε → 0.



























16α2(1 + γ)(−33 − 52γ − 6γ2 + 10γ3)
(33 + 46γ + 16γ2)
2 . (70)
























2α2 (3 − 4γ − 8γ2 + 4γ3)
(3 + 2γ)2(2 + 3γ)
. (71)




C ) > SW
C,N
l (tC,N). To sum up, if γ ∈ (0.5,1], the local
government chooses ¯ t
C,L
C .
Case (b): 1 < γ ≤ 1.823







l (¯ tC,N), from the results of (70) and (71), the local government chooses ¯ t
C,L
C .


















2α2(−11 − 12γ + 2γ2)2
3γ(1 + γ)(11 + 8γ)2 > 0. (72)




C ) with SW
C,N









2α2(9 + 12γ − 5γ2 − 5γ3 + 4γ4)
3γ(1 + γ)(3 + 2γ)2 > 0, (73)
for any γ > 0. Consequently, the local government chooses t
C,L
C .


















I ) = −
2α2 (−33 + γ + γ2)
99γ(1 + γ)
. (74)








I ). Moreover, from result (73), the local
government chooses tL
C, if γ ∈ (3.929,5.266]. If γ ∈ (5.266,6.808], from results (73) and
(74), the local government chooses tL
I .
Case (e): γ > 6.808
In this case, because SW
C,L



















l (¯ tN). Hence, the local government chooses t
C,L
I when γ > 6.808.
From the above, we obtain Proposition 6.
The proof of Proposition 7
We compare world welfare in the case of free trade with that in the case of commitment.
We compare SW F
w with SW C







α2γ2 (2 − 7γ − 14γ2)
(6 + 17γ + 12γ2)
2 . (75)
32Solving (2 − 7γ − 14γ2) = 0 with respect to γ, we obtain γ ≈ 0.203. Therefore,
SW F
w < SW C
w if γ ∈ (0,0.203) and SW F
w ≥ SW C
w if γ ∈ [0.203,0.5].
We compare SW F
w with SW C
w when γ ∈ (0.5,1.5] where licensing occurs under only






α2 (−18 + 33γ + 94γ2 + 60γ3 + 8γ4)
(9 + 18γ + 8γ2)
2 < 0, (76)
if γ ∈ (0.5,1.5].
We compare SW F
w with SW C
w when γ ∈ (1.5,1.823] where licensing occurs in both






2α2(1 + γ)(3 + γ)(−3 + 2γ)(1 + 2γ)
(3 + 2γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 < 0, (77)
if γ ∈ (1.5,1.823].
We compare SW F
w with SW C






2α2 (9 + 6γ − 23γ2 − 8γ3 + 7γ4)
9γ2(3 + 4γ)2 < 0. (78)
Solving (9 + 6γ − 23γ2 − 8γ3 + 7γ4) = 0 with respect to γ, we obtain γ ≈ 2.303.
Therefore, SW F
w < SW C
w if γ ∈ (1.822,2.303) and SW F
w ≥ SW C
w if γ ∈ [2.303,5.266].
We compare SW F
w with SW C






2α2(30 + 7γ)(30 + 73γ)
1089(3 + 4γ)2 > 0. (79)
Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 8
First, we compare the foreign country’s social welfare in the case of free trade with that
in the case of commitment. We compare SW F
f with SW C






α2γ2 (2 + 31γ + 40γ2)
2(6 + 17γ + 12γ2)
2 > 0. (80)
We compare SW F
f with SW C






α2 (18 + 57γ − 52γ2 + 4γ3 + 96γ4)
2(3 + 2γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 < 0. (81)
33We compare SW F
f with SW C






2α2(3 − 2γ)(−15 − 17γ + 8γ2 + 12γ3)
(3 + 2γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 . (82)
When γ > 1.5, (3 − 2γ) is negative and (−15 − 17γ + 8γ2 + 12γ3) is positive if γ >
1.255. Therefore, if γ ∈ (1.5,1.822], SW F
f < SW C
f .
We compare SW F
f with SW C






2α2 (−3 − γ + γ2)(−3 − 13γ + 3γ2 + 10γ3)
9γ2(1 + γ)(3 + 4γ)2 . (83)
When γ > 1.111, (−3 − 13γ + 3γ2 + 10γ3) is always positive and (−3 − γ + γ2) is
positve if γ > 2.303. Therefore, when γ ∈ (1.823,2.303), SW F
f < SW C
f and SW F
f ≥
SW C
f when γ ∈ [2.303,5.266].
We compare SW F
f with SW C






10α2 (−369 + 105γ + 70γ2)
363(3 + 4γ)2 > 0, (84)
when γ > 5.266.
Next, we compare the local country’s social welfare in the case of free trade with
that in the case of commitment. We compare SW F
l with SW C








2(2 + 3γ)(3 + 4γ)
< 0. (85)
We compare SW F
l with SW C






α2 (18 − 27γ − 44γ2 + 20γ3)
2(3 + 2γ)2(3 + 4γ)
< 0, (86)
if γ ∈ (0.5,1.5].
We compare SW F
l with SW C






2α2(−3 + 2γ)(−18 − 27γ − γ2 + 10γ3)
(3 + 2γ)2(3 + 4γ)2 . (87)
When γ > 1.5, (−3+2γ) is always positive and (−18 − 27γ − γ2 + 10γ3) is negative if
γ ∈ (1.5,1.823]. Therefore, SW F
f < SW C
f .
34We compare SW F
l with SW C






2α2 (−3 − γ + γ2)
2
3γ(1 + γ)(3 + 4γ)2 < 0. (88)
We compare SW F
l with SW C






2α2 (585 + 75γ − 49γ2)
99(3 + 4γ)2 . (89)
When γ > 4.304, (585 + 75γ − 49γ2) is negative. Therefore, SW F
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